A few days some folks in internet community noticed Cloudflare AS13335 announcing F root server’s routes covering prefix 192.5.5.0/24. dig version.bind ch txt @f.root-servers.net pic.twitter.com/YLW7hqt170 — Tony Finch (@fanf) April 3, 2017 Above tweet shows that case is clearly not a mistake but rather some sort of arrangement between Cloudflare and ISC (which is responsible for F-root). There was another discussion on DNS-OARC mailing list here. From our bgp.he.net tool, one can analyse route propagation for F root’s AS3557.

A while back I posted about routing filter generation via bgpq3 for Cisco (ios and XR) and Juniper JunOS based routers. I have received a number of emails in last few months about automated filter generation for Mikrotik routeros. Since Mikrotik’s CCRs are getting quite popular across small to mid-sized ISPs. So this blog post is about ways for generating filter config for a given ASN via IRR. One can use such logic with some kind of remote login mechanism like rancid (look for mtlogin here).

India has a slum problem as many of us know. Slums are a serious problem and there’s just no easy way to fix them. One cannot just push thousands and thousands of people out while at the same time quality of life in slums is terrible. One thing which happens a lot in India is the fact that Govt. does nothing when slums are getting established and once they are established situation gets out of control.

Earlier this month I got an opportunity to be part of IXP workshop in Kolkata. It was a 3-day event organised by ISOC Kolkata and supported by APNIC. There was also a workshop on DNSSEC and Champika Wijayatunga (from ICANN) was the instructor along with Anand Raje. It was a nice event and I come to know of other interesting projects ISOC Kolkata is doing like Indian IETF capacity building program apart from the IXP they are running in Kolkata.

Today BGPmon reported about possible BGP prefix hijack of Amazon’s IP address space. Amazon announces 50.16.0.0/16 from AS14618. At 13:45:44 UTC / 19:15:44 IST D-Vois broadband started originating a more specific 50.16.226.0/24 in the table from AS45769. One of example AS_PATH of this announcement: 198290 197264 197264 197264 29467 1299 9583 45769 Clearly, this leak was carried over by AS9583 (Sify) to AS1299 (Telia) and was carried over to rest of internet from there.